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THE IRAQI NATIONALIZATION OF THE
IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF EXPROPRIATION
RALPH B. LAKE
DAVID R. REITSEMA*
On June 1, 1972, Iraq announced the nationalization' of the
assets of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Syria simultan-
eously nationalized the pipeline company linking Iraq with the
Mediterranean. In view of the prediction that the number of
expropriations will drastically increase within the next ten
years,2 the challenge which this phenomenon presents to tradi-
tional international legal concepts is obvious.
A brief history of IPC's involvement in Iraq will serve to
illustrate the difficulties encountered in applying traditional
law. British and Russian interests in the Middle East con-
flicted throughout the nineteenth century, as they do now.
Both used military, economic and political pressure in the at-
tempt to obtain a dominant position there. 3 Following the dis-
covery of commercial quantities of oil at the beginning of this
century, British businessmen and government officials realized
the true potential value of the area. When the company which
held the Persian concession ran into financial difficulties, the
British government bought a controlling interest in what be-
came the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. While the immediate
purpose was to secure a source of oil, the long term effect
was a continuing British presence in the Middle East.
The British government's role in Iraq was substantially
more difficult. In 1914 the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC)
was formed with the Anglo-Persian Company having a 50%6
* The authors are senior students at the University of Denver Col-
lege of Law.
' Attempts to distinguish the terms expropriation, nationalization and
others have become intellectual and impractical exercises when dis-
cussing the taking of property. A more meaningful term may be
"wealth deprivation." See Weston, International Law and the Depri-
vation of Foreign Wealth: A Framework for Future Inquiry, 54 VA.
L. REV. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Weston].
2 THE NATION, June 19, 1972, at 778; FORBES, March 15, 1970, at 28.
3 See G. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL (1970) [hereinafter cited as STOCK-
ING].
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interest. In 1918 the British government gained an additional
25% control in TPC by expropriating a German partner's in-
terest.4 The Sykes-Picot arrangement of 1916, which was os-
tensibly a device to secure support for the Allied cause, also
guaranteed French, British and Russian spheres of influence.5
This agreement strengthened the conditions which enabled the
British to obtain the concession agreement from Iraq for TPC.
The British position was further strengthened by the San Remo
Agreement of 1920 which gave the French a 25% interest in
British oil lands in return for its building an oil transportation
system through Syria. These arrangements were facilitated by
the mandate system instituted at the end of the war by the
League of Nations. TPC obtained its concession in 1925 prior to
the autonomy the British were forced to grant the Iraqis.
The U.S. government had observed the partition of the
Arab world. In 1920 it began to apply pressure on the British
to allow American companies to participate in the exploitation
of Arab oil. The State Department emphasized that the "Open
Door Policy," which was one of the stipulations of the man-
date system, required the power administering the mandate
to preserve the resources until the area was granted freedom."
The American oil companies simultaneously negotiated the de-
gree of participation they were to be granted. This resulted in
two American companies obtaining a combined interest of
23.75% in TPC.7
Major economic developments following World War II
led to the present Middle East oil situation. The first of these
was an initial 50-50 profit sharing arrangement which repre-
sented the beginning of the attempt by the Arab nations to
regain control of oil resources. The second development was a
rising international competition for oil rights beginning in
the 1950's. Until this occurred, the holders of the concessions
had virtually complete control of the means of distribution of
4 Id. at 44.
5 G. CRAIG, EUROPE SINCE 1815 551 (1966).
6 "The American State Department ... insisted on the obligation of the
British government to apply meticulously the principle of the open
door and nondiscrimination in a mandate that it assumed." II FOR. REL.
83 (1921) in STOCKING, supra note 3, at 68.
7 In 1929 TPC changed its name to Iraq Petroleum Company. The present
owners and the amounts are:
23.75% Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (36% government
owned)
23.75% British Petroleum (48% government owned)
23.75% Royal Dutch Shell
23.75% Standard of New Jersey and Mobil (50-50)
5.00% C. S. Gulbankian Foundation
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the oil. The third development, which is a current one, is the
demand by the producing countries for a 51% ownership of
the operations in their countries. 8
The immediate cause of Iraq's recent expropriation was
the threat of IPC to cut production by nearly 50% unless Iraq
agreed to a 35% decrease in the price of petroleum from the
Northern fields. IPC faced a higher cost in marketing the oil
due to an increased cost of distributing it from ports in the
Mediterranean.
For the past ten years the Sabbatino case has fascinated
American international lawyers to such an extent that little has
been done to develop a meaningful perspective by which to
consider the increasing practice of capital importing countries
to eliminate foreign investments. IPC and Iraq are engaged in
negotiations in an attempt to settle their differences. IPC has
indicated that in the event that these negotiations fail to solve
the problem, it will resort to the use of legal remedies. The
nationalization of IPC, therefore, provides a convenient vehicle
with which to examine not only the traditional rules of inter-
national law with respect to expropriation, but also the effects
of modern attitudes upon those rules.
Nationalism, resentment against past colonial injustices and
unfulfilled economic aspirations have produced open hostility
toward foreign investment in many developing countries. This
situation has not only created bleak prospects for their own
economies, 9 but has caused discontent with the previously
accepted law of expropriation.
A rule of law has been defined as an enforceable "con-
crete particularization of an ideal."10 It is the assumption of
the authors that the international law of expropriation should
particularize the ideal of order and predictability in interna-
tional economic relations. The Iraqi nationalization indicates that
the traditional rules have failed to perform this function.
In analyzing the approach to international law taken by
post World War I lawyers, who formulated much of the tra-
ditional law of expropriation, Richard Falk has written that
"they relied for a new system of world order upon agreed
legal rules, but they failed to develop an adequate appreciation
8 Benedict, New Oil Pacts Have Some Leeway, Wall Street Journal,
Aug. 31, 1972, at 6, col. 4.
')This fact was recognized by the International Court of Justice in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, [1952] I.C.J. 93, 162.
10H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 19 (1967).
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of the social and political difficulties of making these rules
into effective behavioral norms."" The rules which they de-
veloped, however, were enforceable by the combined power
of the developed nations.
The international law of expropriation was essentially the
municipal law which Western nations used to govern the tak-
ing of property in their own countries. Thus, traditional legal
concepts of expropriation reflected Western notions of indi-
vidual rights and the sanctity of private property. Interna-
tional law conceded the right of a sovereign to exercise con-
trol of property within its boundaries,' 2 and the rules sur-
round expropriation were designed to protect the rights of
the expropriated owner. Expropriating sovereigns had to take
property for a public purpose and could not discriminate against
foreigners. The expropriated owner had to be given compensa-
tion for his loss. Since the public purpose and discrimination
requirements fit easily into traditional concepts of sovereignty,
they were generally left in the province of the expropriator.
The basic question in an international framework was the
matter of compensation.' 3
Little was done to develop a system of rules which would
govern investors entering foreign countries or provide a work-
able method by which countries could eliminate undesired
foreign investments. More importantly, the law did nothing
to account for future social and political changes. The unrealis-
tic position which this placed a developing country ultimately
created the present uncertain situation concerning the law of
expropriation.
11 Falk, New Approaches to the Study of International Law, 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 477, 478 (1967). Indicative of this are the views expressed
in the legal periodicals. For an example dealing with expropriation -
that social and economic issues "only confuse the issue for the lawyer,"
see Drucker, Edmund Burke's View on Expropriation. 228 THE LAW
TIMES 86, 87 (1959), cited with approval by Domke, Foreign Nation-
alizations, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 586 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Domke].
12 D. P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 851 (1965). The current Soviet
view is that the state has ultimate ownership of all property as an
aspect of sovereignty. This view was also that of feudal England and
of Austin, who wrote that "it may be said for the sake of brevity and
because established language furnishes us with better expression,
that the Sovereign or State has a right to all things within its ter-
ritory, or is absolutely the proprietor or dominus thereof." II J.
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 221 (1878). The Soviet view of
paying no compensation, then, might be called "super traditional"
when compared with contemporary Western legal thought.
13 Traditional international law has steadfastly rejected the removal of
the compensation issue from the jurisdiction of internatonal tribunals
and from the rules of international law. 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 916 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN].
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The narrow conceptual basis of the law has only recently
become totally apparent. Although the Soviet Bloc countries
have traditionally denied the need to pay compensation, there
are presently many capital importing countries which echo
the same view, but for other reasons. As mentioned earlier, law
is an enforceable particularization of an ideal. Through the
1950's, Western economic, diplomatic and military power was
such that it was able to enforce traditional legal norms in
expropriation cases. 4 Traditional law was designed to deal
with situations which no longer are very important. Micro-
economic situations, such as the recovery of a ship or its cargo,
have been replaced with situations in which corporations often
have greater wealth and power than the countries in which
they invest. This creates varying degrees of pressure on the host
country - something which may or may not be tolerated by
its leaders. New markets for the products of developing
countries, increased demand within old markets and the be-
ginnings of cooperation between capital importing countries
have eroded the ability of the developed countries to enforce
the rules which they created. The dilemma of the oil companies
in the Middle East illustrates this development. There, com-
panies are confronted-with the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) 15 and an ever increasing world wide
demand for petroleum.
The "classical" international law of expropriation 6 may
be analyzed by reference to specific current and historical
instances in which it was evoked. It is important to notice
that the official U.S. position has remained constant for a least
a half century, 7 and to a great extent so has that of the ex-
14Rubin, in Nationalization and Compensation- A Comparative Law
Approach, 17 U. CHI. L. R. 458 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Rubin],
notes this with the folowing examples of induced compensation from
Eastern European countries (which do not accept the view that corn-
pensation is necessary): Russia paid no compensation as it was too
powerful and there was no inducement; Yugoslavia paid the U.S. $15
million fcllowing WWII because the U.S. held $47 million of Yugo-
slav gold; Czechoslovakia paid Britain Yl0 million following WVWII
because Britain agreed to allow a £5 million annual trade deficit.
15 Western companies have agreed to the equity participation by Persian
Gulf countries, and are under pressure to grant such participation to
all OPEC members. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1972, at 3, col. 2.
" B.A. WORTLEY. EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as WORTLEY].
17 See generally, WHITEMAN, supra note 13, at 1020 et seq. For example,
in reference to Mexico's exprcpriaiion of American property, Secre-
tary cf State Hull s'ated that ". . . it ha3 been stated [by the U.S.
governmentl that the right to expropriate property is coupled with
. . . the obligation to make adequate. effective and prompt compen-
sation." Id. at 1020. In explaining U.S. refusal to affirm the agrarian
reform resolution adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference
1972
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propriating countries.' 8 What is unique now are the increasingly
vocal and hostile arguments of the expropriating countries in
support of their actions, the frequency of expropriation incidents
and the success expropriating governments have enjoyed in
not compensating the owners.
Expropriation has always been accepted as a legal function
of a sovereign entity.' However, the application of restrictions
on this sovereign right has been the subject of continuing de-
bate. Traditionally, expropriation was legal if the following
conditions were met: 1) compensation was paid to the owner
for the propery taken, 2) the property was taken for a public
purpose, and 3) there was no discrimination between foreign
and local interests. The difficulty with applying any of these
conditions is well illustrated by the current controversy be-
tween Iraq and IPC.
Traditional law required that compensation be given before
the taking occurred, unless there were special emergency cir-
cumstances. The current view is that compensation may be
given post facto, and that it must comply with the three re-
quirements of being prompt, adequate and effective. The fact
that Western capital exporting countries still assert this view
in the face of opposition from the Soviet Bloc and capital im-
porting countries is seen in the British government's reaction
to the nationalization by Iraq on June 1. A government spokes-
man complained that Great Britain found the nationalization
unacceptable because "no provision [had] been made for prompt,
adequate and effective compensation.12
Problems arise in the application of this phrase to specific
incidents. The promptness of compensation demanded by this
view is a rare occurrence.2' The difficulty in being prompt
may be occasioned not only by insufficient resources but by
other problems including the basic problem of determining
the value of property. For example, the claim of IPC for com-
pensation equal to the market value of the property taken is
at Caracas (1954), the State Department explained that "it could not
support the resolution because it was based largely on the narrow con-
cept of land distribution and implied confiscation . . . [t]here are few
human desires stronger than that to posess a little spot of earth which
they can call their own." Id. at 1061.
18 See Nusbaum, The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd.
and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950); comments
concerning IPC expropriation by Dr. Pachachi, President of OPEC,
N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 55, col. 4.
19 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 12.
20 Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1972, at 6, col. 3, referring to Iraqi Law
69 of 1972, Art. 3.21 Domke, supra note 11, at 604.
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greater than Iraq's annual budget for 1972.22 This situation is
further complicated by the insistence of IPC that future profits
be considered part of the loss it sustained.23 Payment of com-
pensation in a case such as this is so complicated that it would
be extremely difficult to comply with the prompt, adequate and
effective requirements of the law.
The requirement that the taking be for a public purpose
is so vague that it eludes any accurate definition. This require-
ment originiated in municipal law, and it
* . . may have had a reasonably definite meaning in interna-
tional law when the municipal systems of the states that led
in the development of international law were based on pri-
vate ownership of the means of production. However, in view
of the increasingly broad area of activity in neary all states,
the concept of public purpose or public use seems increasingly
vague and of doubtful usefulness in the future.24
Public purpose includes some notion of special occasion. A taking
for national defense is perhaps the most obvious special occasion,
but another instance is pure economic necessity.25 It must be
something beyond a mere desire to deprive the foreign owners
of property. It has been termed "an exceptional procedure for
special need,' 26 and "the very pith of the so-called rule of
public utility. ' '27 The statement of the Iraqi delegation to the
U.N. contained an appeal to this rule, stating that "the grave
economic implications of such a drastic reduction in revenues
are too obvious to require any elaboration.'28 The dependence
of Iraq on oil revenue seems to cause the expropriation to fall
within the special occasion category, 29 as IPC contributed 80%
of Iraq's foreign exchange.3 0
Expropriation for the purpose of punishment of political
acts is not recognized as being for a public purpose. While a
state may take the property of aliens without compensation
for a criminal act, the offense must be one "generally recog-
nized as such in public international law, or a crime accepted
22 See infra notes 51, 52.
23 N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 55, col. 4.
2 4
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, "Responsibilities of States for Injuries to Aliens" §185(a),
comment a at 554 (1965).
25 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 853-54 (1965).
26 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 25.
27Weston, supra note 1, at 1088.
28 Statement, Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, June,
1972, at 1.
29For example, Iraq's total income from oil in 1968 was £ 203 million,
or almost 80% of its total foreign exchange income. STOCKING, supra
note 3, at 463, and infra note 30.
30N.Y. Times, June 10, 1972, at 37, col. 3.
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as such by the confiscating state and the state of the person
punished . . . . "31 There is a tone of righteous indignation in
the scant Iraqi material available concerning their taking of
IPC, and it seems that some notion of criminality, or at least
wrongdoing, was present in the decision to expropriate. The
press release of the Iraqi delegation refers to the concession
agreement as being "unjust" and proclaims that "Iraq . . . shall
not be deterred or intimidated by the pressures and the maneu-
vers of the companies. '32 A telegram sent to the Iraqi Revolu-
tionary Command Council (the governing body of the country)
by the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) supported that at-
titude, stating that the "imperalist oil companies . . . backed
by imperalist forces attempt to subjugate our victorious revo-
lution and its gigantic profits. '33 However, even if one char-
acterized the 1925 concession as imposed under colonial con-
ditions, as the Iraqis do,34 it seems impossible to rationally
press criminal accusations against IPC on a legal basis. IPC's
actions were not criminal within Iraq, nor were they in relation
to international law.
Discrimination against foreigners defeats the argument of
public purpose, and even those authorities which advocate that
any public purpose is sufficient to justify expropriation require
that it be non-discriminatory. 35 In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v
S.U.P.O.R. Co., an Italian court noted the non-discrimination
requirement. It found that Iran's taking of the company was
non-discriminatory, since its primary purpose was the economic
welfare of the country rather than a mere confiscatory action.3 6
The production cutback by IPC and the resulting loss of reve-
nue by Iraq is similar to Iran's case in that Iraq is completely
dependent on oil for its governmental revenue.3 In addition,
3 1 WoRTLEY, supra note 16, at 40. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized
this even though it did not address itself to substantive issues of in-
ternational law. "There is authority ... for the view that a taking is
improper . . . if it is not for a public purpose." Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398. "The Cuban expropriations provide
a classic example of taking, the purposes of which were admittedly
punitive." Id. at 429.
32 Statement: Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, June,
1972, at 3.
33 INOC Weekly News, May 29, 1972, at 2.
34 Iraq and OPEC position stated in N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 67,
col. 2.
35 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 120.
36 [1955] I.L.R. 23, 39, 40; cited in WHrrHmAN, supra note 13, at 1056-57.
37 Production was cut by IPC in the northern fields by 50% in an ap-
parent attempt to force Iraq to reduce the prices by 35%, N.Y. Times,
June 6, 1972, at 55, cols. 5, 6; normal production was 1.1 million bar-
rels per day, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1972, at 37, col. 2.
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there were no local oil producing interests other than the gov-
ernment operated INOC, so the expropriation could not be
called discriminatory in the sense of favoring local interests
at the expense of foreign interests.
Discrimination against one group of foreigners in favor of
another group also defeats the argument of public purpose.
While the expropriation decree simply stated that "the opera-
tion of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd. . . . shall be na-
tionalized, s3 8 the French partner was simultaneously given an
option to negotiate separately with the government. This option
was given by the Iraqi government because of the French sup-
port of the Arab position in the Middle East conflict.39 It must
be concluded that with respect to discrimination, the action
taken by Iraq is in violation of traditional law.
It has been recognized that a party which has been granted
a concession has not only property rights, which may be
expropriated as a function of sovereignty, but also rights aris-
ing under a contract.4 A concession places a higher duty upon
countries which grant it, because the premature termination
of a concession allows the party holding it to receive damages
equal to the "benefit of the bargain," as well as compensation
for the property value. Arbitrariness is the primary considera-
tion in determining whether a concession was wrongfully ter-
minated.41 If Iraq's action is determined to be arbitrary, the
fact that Iraq terminated the concession decades before it was
due to expire indicates that Iraq may have to pay an astro-
nomical sum as compensation.
The area of contractual rights and obligations has many
ramifications which will be very briefly covered here. One
issue is that a contract must be freely negotiated. The conces-
sion granted to IPC is notable in that Iraq was under a "Treaty
of Friendship" with Great Britain. This treaty was a substitute
for and had the same effect as the mandate situation. One may
thus question whether the concession grant was truly a sov-
ereign act.42 It is further to be noted that concession agreements
38 Iraq. Law No. 69 (1972), Art. 1. 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 846 (1972).
.9 N.Y. Times, June 2, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
40 Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 555, (1961).
41 Id. at 570.
42 "The King and his cabinet ratified the new concession on March 14,
1925, one week before King Fai.al promulgated Iraa's organic law
and approximately seven month- before the Iraqi Parliament ratified
the treaty defining Irao's obligations under the mandate orinciple; in
short before an autonomous Iraq government had anything to say
about it." STOCKING, supra note 3, at 52.
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must be honored by successor governments if "every act nec-
essary for vesting them in the holder has been performed. 4 3
It has been said that one of the necessary acts is that the
granting be "discretionary" on the part of the party granting
it.14 It is obvious, then, that the existence of contractual obli-
gations is an issue which will be raised by both parties: Iraq
on the basis of unfairness, IPC on the basis of contract obliga-
tions.
Two options appear possible from this application of tra-
ditional law to Iraq's actions. The first is to simply apply in-
ternational law with the resulting determination that Iraq
has broken the law by discriminating between groups of for-
eigners. The companies which suffered the expropriation have
the right to recover the loss, much as in the case of Iran's
taking of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's property. The
difficulty with this option is that both sides are able to present
rational arguments in support of their position. As was seen
in the case of Iran, courts of other countries are forced to
accept one or the other position. The resulting solution will be
unpredictable and will possibly be unsatisfactory to both par-
ties. 45 This approach has resulted in uncertainty and distrust
between the companies and host countries.
The alternative option is an admission that the traditional
rules of international law are no longer viable and that a
reshaping of the law is imperative to provide a meaningful
framework to stabilize world economic relationships. Richard
Falk has made a similar proposal for dealing with the general
problem of the relation of law to world affairs: [T]he objective
is to develop attitudes and habits that encourage international
43 1. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (8th ed. H. LAUTERPACHT)
(1956).
44Huang, Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 AM. J. INT'L L.
277 (1957). See also Carlston, International Role of Concession Agree-
ments, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 618 (1959).
45Iran's Nationalization Law provided for 25% of receipts to be set
aside for the purpose of paying the company for the taking. WHITE-
MAN, supra note 8, at 1170. This "intent" to pay defeated the com-
pany's subsequent claim that the taking was confiscatory. Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, [1953] I.L.R. 305,
310-11 (Tokyo D.C., 9th C.D., Japan). Exactly the opposite result was
reached by a less partial court in Aden which held the expressed
intent too vague by itself. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. Jaffrate
and Others (The Rose Mary), [1953] I.L.R. 316, 321-22 (Supreme
Court, Aden). An Italian court held that any intent expressed by an
expropriating country was sufficient to meet international rules:
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. S.U.O.R. Co. (The Miriella), [1955]
I.L.R. 19, 22-3 (Court of Venice, Italy).
law to become increasingly a system of world order rather than
to serve as a style of argument in international relations.'4 ,
As an illustration of factors influencing current interna-
tional economic relationships, two socio-legal issues will be
raised. These are the nationalistic movements within the host
countries, and the lack of political accountability on the part
of the companies. These two issues will serve as indications of
the direction in which the law will move if it is to regain
a meaningful validity.
Nationalism is one of the most important causes of the
controversy between the companies which support the tradi-
tional law and the developing countries. Perhaps the most
striking aspect of the expropriations by these countries is the
hostile attitude of their leaders toward the presence of foreign
capital.47 A professional observer of the industry described his
reaction to the 1960 Second Arab Petroleum Congress by stat-
ing that "I was unprepared for the hostility, bitterness and
suspicions manifested by Congress spokesmen for the host
countries .... ,,41 Indeed, in matters of such financial importance
one would expect a more economically oriented position. It
is interesting to note that the result of expropriation is often
financial disaster to the country. Mexico's expropriation of the
oil industry led to tax revenues being replaced by government
subsidies; Iran's expropriation put the country in a state of
financial chaos; and Chile's recent taking of its copper industry
has had a result similar to Iran's.
Nationalism has led to social and cultural changes of such
major proportions that challenges to the economic status quo
are inevitable. The concept of state sovereignty, the original
basis for the ideal of a state being permitted to take property
for a public purpose, is now being invoked by Iraq to support
its expropriation. 49 OPEC described Iraq's action as "a lawful
act of sovereignty by Iraq to safeguard its legitimate interests." '
Thus, we find the state of the law to be a mere style of argu-
46Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-
Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 242 (1964).
47See Rubin, supra note 14, at 458; Iraq's President Bakr, in his ex-
propriaticn decree stated that "We have decided to go on the of-
fensive against the oil monopolies," N.Y. Times, June 2, 1972, at 7,
col. 1; Syria's President Assad described the pipeline seizure as "in
conformity with our policy for economic liberation," N.Y. Times,
June 3 1972, at 37, col. 2.
48 STOCKING, supra note 3, at vii.
49 Statement, Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, June,
1972, at 3.
5o Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1972, at 11, col. 2.
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ment rather than a system which provides investors and host
countries alike with order and stability in their international
economic affairs.
The weakness of traditional international law with respect
to nationalism is paralleled by its lack of legal provisions deal-
ing with the political accountability of international companies.
It must be emphasized that in many cases a company possesses
greater wealth and power than the host country. For example,
the total government revenue of Iraq in 1969, $291 million,51
can be compared with the gross incomes of the two American
partners of IPC, $4 billion.5 2 The loss of revenue from IPC has
forced Iraq to cut its 1972 budget by 40% and potentially much
more.5 ' Also, Iraq's prospect of disposing of a sizeable quantity
of the expropriated oil seems unlikely.5 4
Not only do the companies possess great wealth, but also
they are supported by the economic and political power of the
developed nations. The power which this combination produces
may be seen in the rivalry between Russia and Great Britain
over the control of Iran. The Russians were principally inter-
ested in territorial gains, while Britain desired economic su-
premacy of the whole Middle East for its commercial interestsY'
The effect of this was that "only the commercial and political
rivalry of Great Britain seemed then, as does now that of the
United States, to bar the way to the complete absorption of
Iran into the Russian orbit.' '5 ' This government-industry part-
nership remains in effect although supplemented by a U.S.
presence. It has been stated that "the C.I.A. generally receives
credit for the coup that restored the Shah to power. ' '5 7 Clearly
51 EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LIMITED, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
286 (18th ed. 1971).
52 MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, 3119, 2700
(1972).
. Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
54 Italy has agreed to buy 40,000 barrels per day. Wall Street Journal,
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the resulting restoration of the Shah led to a continuing U.S.
economic presence in Iran. There is little to indicate that this
siutation is changing, and it may be unrealistic to suppose that
any law is capable of dealing with it.
Considering the foregoing discussion of the nationalism of
capital importing countries and the great power of the inter-
national companies, one is impressed with the difficulty of
achieving order in economic affairs. An examination of recent
expropriations, beginning with the case of Iran and culminating
in Iraq's action, illustrates the increasing difficulty of applying
traditional international law. International law was invoked in
the 1951 Iranian expropriation. Iran's expropriation decree made
a specific provision that 25% of future oil revenues would be
set aside to pay compensation.5 s This was held by some courts
to be sufficient to meet legal requirements.5 9 International law
was enforceable as evidenced by the numerous legal actions
instituted by the company. The threat of legal action as well
as the availability of alternative sources of petroleum prevented
Iranian sale of sizeable quantities of the oil. The international
petroleum cartel, in order to protect its interests and to dis-
courage future expropriations, was able to dissuade potential
purchasers of Iranian oil from buying it. The resulting loss of
revenue caused the fall of the government and an acknowl-
edgement of Iran's obligation to the company.60
The Chilean expropriation of 1970 may be viewed as an
interim step between the takings of Iran and Iraq. Chile went
through the motions of complying with international law, and
acknowledged an obligation to pay compensation. It then made
a mockery of the law by first changing its Constitution to
permit the expropriation,"1 and then demadning that the com-
panies compensate Chile for "excess profits" earned during
the period of agreement.
62
When reviewing the Iraqi situation the initial positions of
both parties seem based more on notions of fairness and equity
than law. Although Iraq has stated that it will pay compensa-
tion, no procedure for doing so has been provided, as it was in
58 See supra note 45.
59 Id.
60 Iran's oil income dropped from £7 million in 1951 to zero in 1952.
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INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1240 (1971).
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Iran's decree. Also, the Iraqi decree never mentioned the word
"law." The position of IPC has been to vigorously assert the
traditional rules of law, but the realities of the situation sug-
gest that this is only a bargaining tool. It appears, in con-
clusion, that both sides plan to settle the matter at the ne-
gotiating table with few other considerations than the realities
of power.
While it is not the purpose of this article to predict what
the law of expropriation will be in the future, it seems safe to
predict that traditional international law must be adjusted to
allow it to become an enforceable particularization of the ideal
of economic order. The Iraqi situation shows that there has
been a significant change in the bases of political and eco-
nomic power. The application of traditional international law
and a concurrent failure to recognize these political and eco-
nomic changes will only serve to frustrate the realization of
this ideal.
